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“TRUMP”—WHAT DOES  
the NAME SIGNIFY?  
or, PROTOFASCISM and  
the ALT- RIGHT
Three Contradictions of the Present Conjuncture
Matthew Flisfeder
Abstract This article examines the rise of the alt- right and Donald 
Trump’s successful campaign for president of the United States in 
the context of three overlapping contradictions: that of subversion 
in postmodern culture and politics, that between the democratic and 
commercial logics of the media, and that of the failure of the Left in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The article looks at the rise of 
“Trumpism” and the new brand of white nationalist and misogynistic 
culture of the so- called alt- right in its historical context to show how 
it is consistent with but also distinguished from previous right- wing 
ideologies. More generally, the three contradictions presented here 
are proposed as explanations for understanding the mainstreaming of 
the alt- right in contemporary politics and culture.
Keywords alt- right, mass media, postmodernism, social media,  
Donald Trump
No one seriously concerned with political strategies in the current 
situation can now afford to ignore the “swing to the Right.” We may not 
yet understand its extent and its limits, its specific character, its causes 
and effects. . . . But the tendency is hard to deny. It no longer looks like a 
temporary swing in the political fortunes, a short- term shift in the balance 
of forces.
 — Stuart Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show”
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Fascism Ascendant?
These lines, written by Stuart Hall, were a response to the rise of 
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom in the 
late 1970s, where the conservative New 
Right was mobilized in the birthing days 
of neoliberalism as a kind of cultural logic 
to hegemonize the masses away from the 
failing welfare state in its period of crisis. 
Today, after nearly a decade dealing with 
the crisis of neoliberalism and its new 
regime of hyperausterity, we are again 
witnessing the rise of a rightist movement 
mobilizing around President Donald Trump. 
Although it is often commonplace today 
to connect Trump to previous figures of 
conservatism, like Margaret Thatcher, the 
neoconservative movement that galva-
nized around George W. Bush, the Moral 
Majority movement of the 1980s, or the 
culture wars of the 1990s, or even the 
fascism of the mid- twentieth century, I 
want to propose that the rise of “Trump-
ism” has its own distinct historical logic. It 
is a protofascist movement (see Jameson 
1979: 15), but one that is particular to its 
own historical conditions of existence.
In what follows, I propose three histor-
ical and contextual contradictions that help 
explain the rise of Trumpism and the new 
brand of white nationalist and misogynistic 
discourse and violence — whose perpetra-
tors often frame their positions in terms 
of a backlash against progressive and 
resistant politics — collectively referred to, 
using its own politically correct term, as 
the alt- right. This term, according to Angela 
Nagle, was initially used by members of 
its various groups to define “a new wave 
of overtly white segregationist and white 
nationalist movements and subcultures, 
typified by spokespeople like Richard 
Spencer [president of the white nationalist 
think tank the National Policy Institute], 
who has called for a US white ethno- 
state and a pan- national white empire” 
(2017: 12). The alt- right is characterized 
by its preoccupation with “IQ, European 
demographic and civilizational decline, 
cultural decadence, cultural Marxism, anti- 
egalitarianism and Islamification” (12). As 
expressed by the alt- right darling himself, 
Milo Yiannopoulos, the movement is distin-
guished from “old- school racist skinheads” 
by its obsession with intelligence. He 
writes (with fellow Breitbart blogger Allum 
Bokhari) that those in the alt- right “are a 
much smarter group of people — which 
perhaps suggests why the Left hates them 
so much. They’re dangerously bright” 
(Bokhari and Yiannopoulos 2016).
Perhaps it is its penchant for a kind 
of pseudo- intellectualism that makes the 
alt- right somewhat more palatable than 
its more apparently extremist predeces-
sors. It is dangerous because it comes off 
in some circles and spaces (particularly 
online spaces in the Chan culture) as being 
intellectual and cultured, rather than draw-
ing influence from the religious moralism 
of the New Christian Right, for instance. 
Spencer himself lists Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Carl Schmitt among his influences 
(Wood 2017). But the alt- right’s appeal to 
intellect, more than a reference to specific 
thinkers and texts, has more to do with 
what it perceives as its legitimate claim 
to power: in the struggle for supremacy, 
“nothing matters, not inheritance, social 
connections, or economic resources, 
but one’s native intelligence and innate 
strength” (Robin 2011: 29). The alt- right 
therefore seeks to distance itself in this 
way from both an older group of neo- Nazi 
skinheads and the Ku Klux Klan, but also, 
as Nagle notes, from traditional conserva-
tism and the conservative establishment, 
which is often dismissed as “cuckser-
vatives” (2017: 12). Yet how odd that 
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Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand — as one 
news headline put it, “Ayn Rand is dead. 
Liberals are going to miss her” (Burns 
2017) — have been replaced by Trump, a 
man who reeks of imbecility and inepti-
tude. Something more must be going on.
Indeed, as Corey Robin notes, con-
servatism “is the theoretical voice of  
[the] animus against the agency of the  
subordinate classes. It provides the most 
consistent and profound argument as 
to why the lower orders should not be 
allowed to exercise their independent 
will, why they should not be allowed to 
govern themselves or the polity” (2011: 
7). For the conservative, hierarchy is order. 
But what drives the “reactionary mind” 
of the conservative, as Robin puts it, is 
the experience of power besieged — that 
feeling of having (once) had power and 
now seeing it threatened. This is why, 
according to him, white men, regardless of 
class status, are particularly interpellated 
by conservative ideology. Feminism and 
antiracism, for instance, challenge the 
existing power of phallocentrism/patriarchy 
and Eurocentrism. Robin explains that, 
although the claim is often that the Left 
demands more equality while the Right 
decries more freedom, the disagreement 
between the two has in fact more to do 
with the extension of freedom. Historically, 
he claims, “the conservative has favored 
liberty for the higher orders and constraint 
for the lower orders. What the conserva-
tive dislikes in equality, in other words, is 
not a threat to freedom but its extension. 
For in that extension, he sees a loss of his 
own freedom” (8).
Given the extension of freedom to 
women and racialized minorities, it is 
easy to understand the populist appeal of 
conservatism to the average Joe. Despite 
the fact that conservatism is an ideology 
that preserves the power of the elite, the 
average Joe, in railing against emergent 
forces on the left demanding extensions 
of freedoms for the oppressed, seeks to 
preserve his own relative power vis- à- vis 
gendered and racialized minorities. In this 
sense, too, “radicalism is the raison d’être 
of conservatism” (21) — the radical demand 
for social and political change is what 
drives the conservative reaction toward 
preserving the relations of power. How-
ever, this is not to suggest that the conser-
vative Right lacks a desire for change and 
transformation in favor of traditionalism. In 
fact, to preserve existing forms of power, 
the conservative Right constantly requires 
incorporating the rhetoric of change as part 
of its interpellative practices. It must posit 
the Left as the reigning ideology and must 
assume some of the characteristics of the 
radical to restore vigor to the movement 
(24). By doing so, the conservative Right 
incorporates the lower orders, allowing 
them “to locate themselves symbolically 
in the ruling class.” As Robin puts it, 
“Ordinary people get to see themselves in 
the ruling class by virtue of belonging to a 
great nation among nations, and they also 
get to govern lesser beings through the 
exercise of imperial rule” (35). This is the 
essence of right- wing populism: “to appeal 
to the mass without disrupting the power 
of elites or, more precisely, to harness the 
energy of the mass in order to reinforce or 
restore the power of elites” (55).
The new alt- right, however, should be 
distinguished from the brand of American 
neoconservatism tied to support for the 
George W. Bush regime. As Wendy Brown 
notes, American neoconservatism as a 
political force emerged from a conver-
gence of interests, including evangelical 
Christianity, Jewish Straussians, secular 
Cold Warriors, and conservative feminists 
and family moralists (2006: 696). What 
binds these seemingly disparate groups 
CUP141_01Flisfeder_1pp.indd   3 1/11/18   9:09 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Matthew Flisfeder
C
U
LT
U
R
A
L 
P
O
L
IT
IC
S 
•
 1
4:
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8
4
under the rubric of neoconservatism is 
their affirmation for a moralist state power 
both domestically and internationally. Thus 
the neoconservative Moral Majority move-
ment abandoned “classic conservative 
commitments to a modest libertarianism, 
isolationism, frugality and fiscal tightness, 
belief in limits and moderation, and affinity 
with aristocratic virtues of refinement, 
rectitude, civility, education, and discipline” 
for an avowed drive to power, paranoid 
about the crumbling morality of the West 
(697). Neoconservatism therefore imputes 
to the state the authority to set the moral- 
religious compass of society (697). The 
alt- right is distinguished by its chiding of 
moral- religious rightness. In fact, its blatant 
crassness is one of its most identifiable 
features.
Much of the popularity of the alt- right, 
and the attention it has received in the 
mainstream mass media, prior to Trump’s 
election, was due partly to its combina-
tion of crude humor and youthfulness, 
and because of its image- based culture 
of online meme production in forums like 
4Chan and 8Chan (Nagle 2017: 13). Tradi-
tional conservatives took notice of the alt- 
right and began to incorporate some of its 
nihilistic and ironic tones, developed in the 
Chan culture, because of its vocal opposi-
tion to such Left forces as political correct-
ness, feminism, and multiculturalism (16). 
The alt- right and traditional conservatives 
have thus found an alliance in challenging 
the apparent Left penchant for oppressing 
“free speech,” which the alt- right and con-
servatives see as a product of feminism 
and (so- called) cultural Marxism’s push for 
political correctness, and collectively refer 
to as social justice warriors or SJWs.
What makes the alt- right such an 
oddly fascinating (yet no less concerning) 
movement is that it seems to use cyni-
cism and irony in staging and borrowing 
language and tactics from the New Left of 
the 1960s. At a very formal level, it seems 
to promote itself as a radical alternative 
movement against what it positions as the 
dominant ruling ideology. It is a reactionary 
movement against the liberal center; how-
ever, it is a pseudo - emancipatory move-
ment that targets culture and different 
cultural identities, instead of the political 
economy of capitalism, and its class rela-
tions, as the source of today’s problems. 
Culture, rather than the political economy 
of capitalism, is for the alt- right the real 
problem.
Both the rise of Trump and the alt- right 
share populist and chauvinistic dimensions 
in common with an older European fas-
cism, which, to paraphrase Slavoj Žižek,  
is in a sense a “conservative revolution”:  
it is capable of organizing dissent by recog-
nizing people’s authentic frustration with 
the status quo; but rather than address 
the core problem, that is, the relations of 
exploitation in capitalism, for instance, it 
displaces this problem onto a false prob-
lem (2008: 304). Usually, for right- wing 
populism, this means blaming some kind 
of false image of an enemy or intruder who 
disrupted the system from within: the anti- 
Semitic representation of Jews and Jewish 
people, for instance, as in Nazi Germany; 
or as in a more traditional conservatism, 
those who identify as queer, who are sup-
posedly responsible for the disintegration 
of the institution of marriage; or even the 
Muslim other whom we are told we must 
fear as the “terrorist” threat. And so forth 
and so on. As the logic goes — from the 
perspective of the Right, of course — the 
problem is not the system itself but the 
(image of) the false enemy. The figure of 
the enemy is surfaced as a fetish figure to 
evade or disavow the existing problems 
and inherent contradictions in the capital-
ist mode of production and its increasing 
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tendency toward mass proletarianization 
(see Jameson 2010).
Today, for the alt- right, this false 
enemy has multiple identities. On the one 
hand, it is formed through standard prac-
tices of racism and sexism, thus extending 
the post- 9/11 violence against the Muslim 
other. On the other hand, the alt- right  
has targeted particularly politicized groups, 
the vaguely defined “Islamicists,” for 
instance, as opposed to Muslims. How-
ever, one primary target of the alt- right 
has been feminism. The alt- right is largely 
masculinist and antifeminist, concerned 
with the decline of Western masculinity, 
and therefore feminism has been one of 
its chief targets. It is not simply that the 
alt- right is misogynist (which it certainly is); 
it specifically targets political feminism,  
aided in part by selective female voices, 
such as the self- dubbed “factual femi-
nist,” Christina Hoff Sommers (1995), who 
denounces contemporary third- wave and 
postmodern feminism. We saw this, for 
instance, in the #GamerGate fiasco in  
the summer of 2014, where female games 
critics, such as Anita Sarkeesian and Zoe 
Quinn, were harassed online by swarm 
attacks, threatening violence and rape. 
This was all because Sarkeesian and  
Quinn sought to introduce feminist critique 
and themes into gamer culture, which male  
gamers saw as an affront to their free 
speech. They believed largely that femi-
nist critiques of gamer culture were just 
more SJW “nonsense” and that from 
their perspective, the critics were being 
oversensitive, seeking to censor male 
gamers. The extremely violent and sexist 
backlash was, then, as Nagle notes, a mas-
culinist response to political correctness, 
paradoxically to prove that gamer culture 
was definitely not sexist (2017: 20). This 
movement targets politicized groups rather 
than individuals based simply on race or 
gender, since this creates the appearance 
that Left political movements, like femi-
nism, are figures of dominant authority — it 
makes it look like feminism is a dominant 
ideology — despite the continued existence 
of systemic (and physical) violence against 
women, which reproduces existing forms 
of inequality. Going after feminism in this 
way reinforces patriarchal domination as a 
social, cultural, and political institution. But 
still, because it is posited as transgressive 
and subversive, the alt- right is tactical in 
displacing blame for existing economic 
problems and cultural conflicts onto liberal 
and Left agents.
My goal is to contextualize and 
historicize the mainstreaming of the new 
alt- right with reference to three overlap-
ping contradictions. These three contra-
dictions help explain Trump’s successful 
campaign in the United States and his 
election as president in November 2016 
as symptomatic and not as a cause of the 
rise of the alt- right. It is already popular to 
make connections between Trump and the 
new legitimacy given to the alt- right. But I 
want to investigate some of the possible 
explanations for this relationship to better 
assess how it could have been otherwise. 
In this regard, the name “Trump,” I claim, 
signifies a new historical moment that is 
symptomatic of these overlapping contra-
dictions. The first contradiction concerns 
the political and cultural context of post-
modern practices of transgression and 
subversion, drawing on aesthetic practices 
that grew out of modernism. The second 
concerns the contradiction between the 
democratic and commercial logics of the 
mainstream mass media; and the third 
deals with the failure of the Left to make 
powerful gains in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. These three overlapping 
CUP141_01Flisfeder_1pp.indd   5 1/11/18   9:09 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Matthew Flisfeder
C
U
LT
U
R
A
L 
P
O
L
IT
IC
S 
•
 1
4:
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8
6
contradictions are by no means exten-
sive, but they do provide some points of 
reflection for understanding the present 
conjuncture.
Contradictions of Subversion and 
Transgression in Postmodern Culture
The rise of Milo, Trump and the alt- right are not 
evidence of the return of conservatism, but instead 
of the absolute hegemony of the culture of non- 
conformism, self- expression, transgression and 
irreverence for its own sake — an aesthetic that 
suits those who believe in nothing but the liberation 
of the individual and the id, whether they’re on 
the left or the right. The principle- free idea of 
counterculture did not go away; it just became the 
style of the new right.
 — Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies:  
The Online Culture Wars from Tumblr and 4Chan  
to the Alt- Right and Trump
It has been claimed that Trump is the 
first “postmodern” president or that his 
presidency is ultimately “postmodern” 
(see, for instance, Ernst 2017; McKnight 
2017; Smart 2017). This seemingly astute 
claim rests on the simple idea that Trump 
is somehow “post- Truth,” a notion that 
came out in full force in particular when 
his campaign manager and now counselor, 
Kellyanne Conway, used the much- mocked 
phrase “alternative facts” to support Press 
Secretary Sean Spicer’s claim that Trump’s 
inauguration was the most highly attended 
ever in American history (which it was  
not) (Bradner 2017). For much of this 
popular criticism, postmodernism amounts 
to little more than a certain brand of rela-
tivism and the rebuking of the real. While 
I disagree with how this claim has been 
deployed, I think that it is right, but for the 
wrong reasons. Trump and the alt- right are 
definitively products of postmodernism, 
but not necessarily in the way it has so 
far been claimed. Although some of the 
more positive features of postmodernism 
as a political and cultural philosophy have 
been its propensity to bring to light the 
underlying Eurocentric and phallocentric 
elements of modern liberal culture, it is 
its “incredulity towards metanarratives” 
(to use the phrase popularized by Jean- 
François Lyotard) that I find most problem-
atic, and its reduction in importance of the 
commodity- class dynamics of late capital-
ism (see Flisfeder 2017). Trump and the 
alt- right, I claim, are in this way symptoms 
of postmodernism — a reaction that can 
be understood only at a formal level in the 
emergence of the postmodern. To return, 
then, to a metanarrative of sorts, the rise 
of Trump and the alt- right must be con-
textualized within the emergence of the 
existing postmodern culture.
The alt- right is, on the one hand, a 
by- product of ideological postmodernism 
and, on the other, the result of the contra-
dictions of subversion and transgression 
within postmodern culture. To understand 
this, it is necessary to first recall in what 
sense subversion itself became part of the 
dominant ideology of postmodern late cap-
italism. In this regard, Fredric Jameson’s 
(1984) cogent application of the Lacanian 
logic of the psychotic’s discourse still 
provides an illuminating aesthetic descrip-
tion of the historical, political, cultural, and 
ideological dynamics of contemporary 
postmodern society. What he describes, 
borrowing equally from Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari (1983), as the “breakdown  
of the signifying chain” — or what Žižek 
(1999) refers to as the demise of symbolic  
efficiency — operates as a kind of short-
hand to describe some of the various 
tenets of postmodernity and postmodern 
culture, including, on both the left and 
the right, an incredulity of sorts toward 
metanarratives (Lyotard 1984), otherwise 
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encapsulated by Francis Fukuyama’s 
(1992) thesis about the “end of history” or 
Daniel Bell’s (1960) about the “end of ide-
ology.” The “breakdown” metaphor high-
lights what Perry Anderson means when 
he says, “Modernism, from its earliest in 
Baudelaire or Flaubert onwards, virtually 
defined itself as ‘anti- bourgeois.’ Post-
modernism is what occurs when, without 
any victory, that adversary is gone” (1998: 
86). Postmodernism is equally, according 
to Terry Eagleton (1996), defined not by 
a victory on the part of the antibourgeois 
but by an imagined defeat — that is, by 
a cynical resignation that, in Thatcher’s 
words, “there is no alternative,” a feature 
that the late Mark Fisher (2009) referred to 
as “capitalist realism.”
This sentiment, of the loss of the 
adversarial relationship between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat — whether 
in the form of the perceived triumph of 
either side — is not at all disconnected from 
the logic of capital. It is tied to the very 
persistence of capital to break down all 
barriers to accumulation. This includes, in 
some cases, the breaking down of political 
and cultural barriers, which is partly what 
the “breakdown” metaphor describes; 
or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the 
constant pursuit of accumulation and the 
breaking down of barriers force a deterrito-
rialization of capital, unleashing it in differ-
ent modalities, or “lines of flight” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 510). Politically, this 
has resulted in the sublation of existing 
antagonisms into the very logic of capital, 
save (of course) for that antagonism that 
is its absolute point of negation: the class 
struggle, which instead of being eliminated 
is simply displaced onto other, cultural 
antagonisms, that is, class war turns into 
“culture war.” This last point helps, in part, 
to explain the rising influence of the Moral 
Majority and neoconservatism among the 
working classes in the United States from 
the late 1970s up to and including George 
W. Bush’s two terms as president. With 
the sublation of class war into culture war, 
it often appeared as though the Right more 
than the (liberal) Left spoke the language 
of the working class (see Frank 2004). It is 
also in this sense that, as Anderson puts 
it, modernity “comes to an end . . . when 
it loses any antonym” (1998: 92), that is, 
when the terms of antagonism get so con-
fused that the image of the actual enemy 
gets blurred. The driving force of the exist-
ing postmodern culture therefore differs 
from the propulsion of the modern culture, 
fueled by antagonism and contradiction.
As a logic of production, capital is 
driven by its dialectic of development, 
constantly in need of destroying the old to 
produce the new (Berman 1982) or, in a 
sense, what David Harvey (2004) means 
by the phrase accumulation by dispos-
session. As such, it consistently requires 
breaking down those older ideological — 
as well as material — barriers that pre-
vent exponential expansion. Modernity 
was therefore culturally contradictory in 
the sense that, for instance, it relied on 
traditional culture — say, the culture of the 
conjugal, patriarchal family — as part of its  
own processes of social reproduction 
while working to break down the struc-
tures of traditional culture to produce new 
subjectivities that could act as agents 
of consumption, the latter of which is 
required to ensure that a crisis of effective 
demand in the market does not ensue. 
This logic of antagonism and contradiction 
operated similarly in art and culture.
The significance of the political 
formation of the bourgeoisie as a class 
is matched by the emergence of the 
market as the material and ideological 
space of shared individual equivalence. 
Regardless of one’s identity outside the 
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market, inside we are all supposedly free 
and equal individuals engaged in acts of 
(fair and equitable) exchange. The market 
logic applied as well to art and culture, 
as the rise of capitalism broke down the 
older relationships between the artist 
and his patron. The commodification of 
art and culture is a contributing factor for 
the emergence of modernism. No longer 
producing for the patron, the artist — now, 
too, “liberated” as “entrepreneurial” 
labor — produced art for the market. But 
modern art was able to carve out for itself 
its own separate sphere, a field of cul-
tural production, the latter defined by two 
points of negation, first, by its vocation 
to not become mere commodity. In this 
sense, modern art sought to distance 
itself from what was later termed mass or 
popular culture — or the “culture industry.” 
Second is the negating influence of new 
media, beginning with the daguerreotype. 
What the technological reproducibility of 
the image instituted in modernism was a 
formal criterion to “make it new!” From 
impressionism onward, through cubism, 
surrealism, and abstract expressionism, 
visual art sought to distance itself formally 
from the production of verisimilitude found 
in popular culture.
On the other hand, the modern avant- 
garde found definition by distancing itself, 
again, from the culture of the bourgeoi-
sie. Culturally, modern artists carved out 
a space for themselves by setting up a 
concept of the bourgeoisie to demonstrate 
precisely what they were not. At the same 
time, modern artists sought to distance 
their work from the political sphere, com-
pletely — hence the tautology “art  
for art’s sake.” So it is in these two ways 
that modernism found definition: by  
railing against what it was not — a 
process of negation — both in terms 
of its object (the work of art itself as 
noncommodity) and in the identity of the 
artists (antibourgeois).
However, capital, being what it is, 
did not take very long to saturate this 
antagonism. While modernism may be 
understood by its vocation to not become 
commodity, postmodernism, we could 
say, is what emerges at the point of total 
commodification in the postwar consumer 
society, where art and commodity begin to 
fold into each other, as in the case of pop 
art, like Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup 
Cans, and later with works of pastiche, 
like Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills. 
But postmodernism is also what emerges 
when the rebellious art of modernism, 
which constantly sought to negate the 
existing world, formally, becomes the 
official art of the canon, the gallery, and 
the university. Put differently — and this is 
one of my central claims — if modernism 
defined itself as a process of subversion 
and negation, postmodernism, culturally, 
is what emerges when subversion itself 
becomes the dominant ideology. It is in 
this sense that we should take seriously 
Žižek’s (2002: 169) warning that we should 
not confuse the ruling ideology with the 
ideology that seems to rule. If subversion is 
now part of the ruling ideology, how might 
we imagine the subversion of subversion?
Alongside these developments in 
the cultural sphere, a parallel conun-
drum emerged in the political spheres of 
Western Europe and North America in 
the 1960s, in the moment of the postwar 
welfare state and Cold War – era class 
compromise between capital and labor, 
which saw the emergence of new sub-
jects of history, in place of the apparently 
nonexistent proletariat. In place of the 
class struggle between capital and labor, 
new social movements (NSMs) — from 
the civil rights movement and postcolonial 
movements to second- wave feminism, the 
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gay liberation movement, and the student 
and antiwar movements — arrived on the 
scene. But just as modern art and culture 
were absorbed into the mainstream, first 
by the logic of commodification and then 
by way of institutionalization, so were the 
NSMs similarly diffused.
A positive feature of the NSMs was 
the kind of criticism that they launched 
against the phallocentrism, heterosexism, 
and Eurocentrism of both the dominant 
culture and the labor movement. However, 
in the campus protest culture of the 1960s 
and 1970s, there was a concerted effort to 
ensure that fights against sexism, racism, 
and homophobia were still conducted in 
the context of a class awareness: hence 
the cultural studies mantra “race- class- 
gender.” With their gaining political 
influence, NSMs had a profound impact 
on the curriculum of humanities depart-
ments in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
with more attention being paid to nonwhite 
and female scholars, writers, and artists, 
launching a kind of academic “culture 
war.” Again, positively, the culture war in 
the university drew attention to issues of 
cultural representation in the media and 
the stereotypical representation of racial-
ized and gendered minorities, which by the 
1990s came to include the representation 
of gays and lesbians, with the addition of 
queer theory to the literature.
Not surprisingly, and not unproblem-
atically, the rising attention to cultural 
representation and questions of diversity in 
the media was picked up by the consumer 
culture. Dick Hebdige’s (1979) now- classic 
study of subculture is useful here. Just as 
the threat of subculture is diffused by and 
incorporated through commodification,  
so have the identity politics of the NSMs 
and the institutionalization of the culture 
wars been incorporated into the branding 
logic of the consumer society, which is 
interested less in multiculturalism and 
diversity, or intersectionality, than with 
maintaining a steady base of diverse 
consumers — the interpellation of new 
subjectivities — still, in order to avoid crises 
of market demand (see Klein 2000). Unlike 
the mass audience culture of the early 
entertainment industries, the contempo-
rary consumer culture is “demassified” in 
the sense that it makes diversity a market-
ing tactic to broaden its reach. But what 
this context also reveals is that here, too, 
rebelliousness, difference, and subversion 
have become part of the reigning ideology 
when it comes to questions of identity. 
Demassification and branding are both tied 
to the commercial diffusion of subversion. 
Rather than ideology interpellating indi-
viduals as compliant subjects, the ruling 
ideology today is grounded on the inherent 
transgression (Žižek 1997) of the ideology 
that seems to rule. Here we face one of 
the central cultural and political contra-
dictions of our time: if, as I have shown, 
in both art and culture, and in the identity 
politics of the NSMs, subversion, far from 
being antagonistic to the existing system, 
has actually become part of its interpella-
tive call — that is, if subversion has itself 
become the dominant ideology (in the case 
of art and culture, the ethic of innovation 
reigns over tradition; in the case of identity 
politics, diversity subverts conformity) — if 
all of this is the case, what does the sub-
version of subversion look like?
This is how the situation must be 
approached from the perspective of the 
new alt- right. What the Left sees as the 
subversion of bourgeois/elitist, phallocen-
tric, and Eurocentric ideology, the alt- right 
sees as the formation of a new culturally 
dominant ideology, best encapsulated 
in the much- disdained call for political 
correctness. The alt- right, too, is antibour-
geois, but perceives and constructs the 
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Left as just such a bourgeoisie, trapped in 
its own libertine elitist bubble. What the 
alt- right, particularly in its white nationalist 
and masculinist bent, finds most objec-
tionable in the politically correct postmod-
ern identity politics is what its members 
perceive as a double standard on ques-
tions of diversity and identity. From their 
perspective, all identities are permissible, 
save for white and conservative, or even 
“normative,” identities. In this scenario, 
when political correctness and postmod-
ern identity politics are posited as the ide-
ology that seems to rule, for the alt- right, 
its politics cannot but appear subversive. 
The alt- right, in fact, is caught up in the 
postmodern interpellative call to subver-
sion. What makes this formation addi-
tionally troubling is that it also, at times, 
seems to rail against the consumer culture 
of postmodern capitalism, making it both 
ironically populist and at times seemingly 
anticapitalist, not unlike the depiction of 
Project Mayhem in David Fincher’s Fight 
Club (1999), an iconic film for members 
of the alt- right. Although the film appears 
radical in its anticonsumerist posturing, 
the film is outrageously misogynistic in its 
equating of consumerism with feminin-
ity. In the fight club, a prototypical men’s 
rights association (MRA) if ever there was 
one, the men literally beat each other up, 
metaphorically beating the consumerism 
and femininity out of themselves.
“Fake News” and “Post- truth”: 
Contradictions of the Media Spectacle
No wonder your President has to be an actor, he’s 
got to look good on television!
— Doc Brown, Back to the Future
Prepare to meet Donald Trump, possibly the first 
“social media” and “reality TV” president.
— Van Jones, “Trump: The Social Media 
President?”
Postmodernism is thus contradictory for, 
on the one hand, instituting and commod-
ifying subversion and transgression as 
an apparent ideology and, on the other, 
for interpellating the proponents of the 
ruling ideology as somehow subversive. 
The second contradiction concerns that 
between the democratic and commercial 
logics of the media. One of the other by- 
products of commodification has been a 
democratization of sorts. Again, in art and 
culture this has meant widening access 
to those spaces previously open only to 
the elite — spaces of cultural consumption, 
like the gallery. Oddly, though, com-
modification has the effect of veiling the 
class antagonism when it now comes to 
accessing art, culture, and information. 
No one is barred from access, so long as 
one can pay the price of admission. For 
conservative cultural critics, like Matthew 
Arnold (1993) and F. R. Leavis (1930), 
and especially for Left cultural critics, like 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 
(2000), the commodification of culture, 
however democratizing to a certain extent, 
still played a role in removing what was 
uniquely valuable about works of art — that 
is, their aura, or their uniqueness in time 
and space, and their ability to speak to the 
sublime essence of the human condition. 
For Adorno, more so, modern art had the 
ability to truly challenge the reigning order, 
in contrast to the products of the culture 
industry, which simply help to reproduce 
capitalism.
The technological reproducibility of 
art, too, according to Walter Benjamin 
(1968), is a factor in the democratization 
of art and culture. Just as paying the price 
of admission grants access to the unique 
work, so too does new media make pos-
sible the widespread dissemination of the 
work so that it can be accessed far and 
wide, beyond the gallery’s limited reach. In 
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fact, this aspect of new media, its ability to 
share information widely, is part and parcel 
of democratization in a political sense. The 
term media has become synonymous with 
the practice of journalism. As journalism, 
the media serve an important function in 
democracy by providing the people with 
the information that they need to make 
critical rational decisions about how to 
participate democratically. However, this 
democratic (fourth estate / public sphere) 
function of the media is contradicted by 
the commercial (i.e., commodified) logic of 
the media.
As media scholars have long demon-
strated, private media companies are 
principally driven, as businesses, by the 
profit motive. This includes contemporary 
new media and social media websites, 
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. 
As Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky 
(1988) demonstrated thirty years ago, the 
commercial logic of the media, particu-
larly influenced by the role of owners and 
advertisers, works toward filtering out 
information that is either detrimental to 
the political status quo or at the very least 
to its bottom line. This includes sifting out 
content that potentially offends advertisers 
or special interest groups. Nevertheless, 
at the same time, the media interpellates 
viewers through the spectacularization and 
sensationalization of news and information 
(see Postman 1985). Since media reve-
nues are still drawn by maximizing viewer 
attention, and the “work” of the so- called 
audience commodity (Smythe 1977), or 
online as the “prosumer commodity” 
(Fuchs 2014a), building a sizable audience 
is still one of the primary motivating factors 
of media production. In this regard, we 
can also see to some degree the “liberal-
ization” of the media in the same sense, 
as has been already discussed in terms 
of the diffusion and branding of diversity. 
This gives some credence to criticisms of 
the mainstream mass media from both the 
Left and the Right.
On the left, the political economic 
critique of the media demonstrates the 
existence of a right- wing, procapitalist bias. 
On the right, however, the mainstream 
mass media is believed to contain an 
underlying liberal bias, which has become 
a favorite target for right – wing radio talk- 
show hosts, like Rush Limbaugh (2015), 
who see the push for political correctness 
and the positive representation of women 
and racialized minorities so much as a 
threat sparked by the “cultural Marxism” 
of the liberal university campuses of the 
1960s and their culture wars. The rise of 
the right- wing website Breitbart News is 
also indicative of this trend, as the site was 
initially conceived as a locus for uncovering 
liberal falsehoods, cover- ups, and conspir-
acies (Solov 2015). Regardless of which 
side is more correct — the Left critique is 
based more in terms of an organizational 
analysis, while the Right critique is based 
more on selective content analysis of the 
supposedly “liberal” media — both the Left 
and the Right apparently have cause for 
not trusting the mainstream media, which 
also makes pop protest songs, like Green 
Day’s “American Idiot” (2004) and Katy 
Perry’s “Chained to the Rhythm” (2017), 
both of which take media as their political 
targets, politically ambiguous. Evidently, 
everyone — whether on the left or right — 
is critical of the “fake news.” This is one 
reason for understanding the techno- 
utopianism about the digital public sphere 
of the Internet, first in the 1990s, with the 
development of the World Wide Web, and 
then again in recent times with the rise 
of the so- called social media revolutions. 
As Nagle notes, “Just a few years ago 
the Left- cyberutopians claimed that ‘the 
disgust had become a network’ and that 
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establishment old media no longer control 
politics, that the new public sphere was 
going to be based on leaderless, user- 
generated social media.” This network, 
she says, “has indeed arrived, but it has 
helped to take the Right, not the Left, to 
power” (2017: 27).
If the protest movements that arose 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall 
Street, themselves organized in part by 
using social media sites like Facebook and 
Twitter (Fuchs 2014b; Herrera 2014; Lenzo 
2013; Tufekci 2013), energizing the techno- 
utopians on the liberal left, this positive 
image of the new Internet and social 
media culture was crushed by the election 
of Trump in November 2016. Not surpris-
ingly, the enthusiasm for the social media 
revolutions that we saw in the mainstream 
media quickly dissipated in the election’s 
aftermath. How could we have all been so 
blindsided? Social media became vilified 
with ensuing reports about online informa-
tion “bubbles” or silos and the problem of 
“fake news” (Lee 2016; Solon 2016).
The “bubble” problem is exacerbated 
by for- profit social media websites, and  
if the prosumer commodity model is 
accurate — where social media sites are 
capable of monetizing user- generated con-
tent and data — then there is an incentive 
to maximize user participation as much 
as possible. This is partly what Jodi Dean 
(2002, 2009, 2010) means when she 
writes about “communicative capitalism.” 
Instead of serving democratic interests, as 
profit- generating platforms, social media 
turn participation and communication into 
means of monetization and revenue build-
ing. Maximizing participation is key, and 
part of the algorithmic logic of sites like 
Facebook includes individuating user expe-
rience in the sense that the feedback loop 
becomes part of the normalized regimen of 
site activity (see Bucher 2012; Finn 2017; 
Langlois 2014; Mager 2014; Srnicek 2016). 
Unlike an older conception of ideological 
passivity, social media use is paradoxical in 
that the more we participate, the more we 
are plugged into the feedback loop of the 
ideological choir club, so to speak, how-
ever lacking in any real encounter with the 
ideological other. In ideal terms, the liberal 
bourgeois conception of the democratic 
public sphere (Habermas 1974) has meant 
more or less — and not without significant 
flaws (Fraser 1990; Mouffe 2000; Spivak 
1988) — an encounter with the other. The 
notion of critical rational public discourse 
is premised on the idea that people in civil 
society must come together to politely 
and openly debate opposing views. Not 
only do the feedback loops and informa-
tion silos on social media prevent such an 
encounter; the new digital society of the 
spectacle is contrarily driven by maximizing 
the number of hits, clicks, likes, and shares 
that a post receives. The digital attention 
economy is very much an effect of the 
neoliberal entrepreneurial ethic of reputa-
tion management (see Flisfeder 2015). In 
the cluttered spaces of the digital sea of 
abundance, attention is valuable currency, 
and getting noticed sometimes means 
being loud and obnoxious.
For the neoliberal ideology, it is primar-
ily the entrepreneur as identity curator who 
is most publicly valorized by the reigning 
sensibility. However, it is the figure of the 
troll — an agent who builds a reputation by 
tarnishing the reputation of others — who 
has become one of the primary antago-
nists of the present, championed heroically 
by the racists and misogynistic meme cul-
ture of the alt- right. For a culture that privi-
leges the troll as its antihero, Trump, then, 
appears as a godsend. Trolls, as Richard 
Seymour (2016) puts it, “are the self- styled 
pranksters of the internet. A subculture of 
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wind- up merchants who will say anything 
they can to provoke unwary victims, then 
delight in the outrage that follows.” What 
drives the troll is the pursuit of “lulz” — a 
cynical form of enjoyment “that derives 
from someone else’s anguish.” And as 
agents of the alt- right, the troll delights 
particularly in the harassment of femi-
nists, cultural Marxists, and PC liberals or 
SJWs. With this use being made of the 
most advanced communications system 
and technology ever to exist, it is worth 
asking if the concerns of conservative 
elitist critics like Arnold and Leavis, or Left 
critics like Horkheimer and Adorno, were in 
fact correct about the commodification of 
culture, especially if digital democracy has 
been reduced to the anything goes, free 
speech fundamentalism of the mascu-
linist alt- right troll. My own inclination is 
that social media can and do still fulfill a 
democratic function, but as with all forces 
of production, must be contextualized 
within the existing relations of production, 
exploitation, and the class struggle.
Finally, what also makes the emer-
gence of the alt- right troll — and Trump as 
a figurehead — so hard to bear for the tradi-
tional liberal Left is that the regular appeals 
to truth seem to have flown out the win-
dow entirely. Even the kind of political eco-
nomic criticism of the mainstream media’s 
propaganda model, expounded by Herman 
and Chomsky, still relies on an older notion 
of ideology as false consciousness. Part of 
the problem that they see with the mass 
media is that its system of filtration cre-
ates a barrier of access for people to the 
truth. They — and Chomsky in much of his 
political commentary in particular — seem 
to rely on the idea that “if only the people 
knew the truth,” then they would revolt 
and demand back their democracy. The 
problem is that followers of the alt- right, 
and Trump in particular, already seem to 
know the truth, but continue to act as if 
this were not the case. In their cynical 
enjoyment of lulz, truth simply does not 
factor in. As Seymour points out, “This 
is what the critique of ‘post- truth politics’ 
misses. Even when he lies egregiously, 
Trump’s fans think he is demonstrating an 
important truth in exposing media fakery.”
The Rise of the Alt- Right out  
of the Failures of the Left
Every rise of Fascism bears witness to a failed 
revolution.
 — Walter Benjamin, “Theories of German Fascism” 
(as quoted by Žižek)
So now we are faced with a culture that 
champions subversion and transgression 
itself being transgressed by the so- called 
alt- right; we are faced with the possibility 
that not even the truth portrayed by the 
media (or truth itself) is enough to bring 
about an enlightened counterpublic. The 
problem today is less the nonknowledge of 
the public than a collective cynical resigna-
tion in the form of what Fisher (2009) calls 
“capitalist realism.” Such an identification 
is built around, first, Thatcher’s well- known 
TINA statement, “there is no alternative,” 
and second, by Jameson’s (1994) thesis 
that it is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than the end of capitalism. This kind 
of cynical resignation has been reinforced 
somewhat by the visible failures of the 
Left ever since the beginning of the 2008 
financial crisis.
Recall, again, that we did see a wave 
of Left protest movements and resistance 
after the 2008 crisis, from the so- called 
Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street 
movement. What was significant about the 
former is that it showed how the strength 
of the people could be a force of change. 
The Occupy movement, in addition, drew 
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significance for directing attention to 
the capital- class dynamic — pointing the 
finger at (or giving “the finger” to) Wall 
Street, using the language of “we are 
the 99%” — and of existing global power 
and the cause behind the 2008 crisis 
(i.e., the dangers of deregulated capital 
and the growth of fictitious capital in the 
form of collateralized debt obligations, 
such as mortgage- backed securities, and 
derivatives, such as credit default swaps). 
However, these movements failed to 
produce any kind of lasting alternative to 
the existing system (OWS was famously 
mocked for being leaderless and for 
lacking concrete “demands” — the imagery 
alone seems to equate OWS with some 
kind of hostage- taking situation), and 
therefore reflected the impotence of the 
Left. Once again, the Left was incapable 
of producing change. There have been 
different material dimensions to each new 
rise of the Right in recent years, whether 
it is Trumpism, the Brexit vote, or the new 
alt- right. But in many ways, they are all 
reactionary responses to the failure of the 
Left in the wake of the crisis.
Phenomena like the rise of the alt- right 
demonstrate quite clearly that “every rise 
of Fascism bears witness to a failed revolu-
tion.” This phrase, which Žižek (2006: 363; 
2009: 73; 2010: 152; 2014: 101) often attri-
butes to Walter Benjamin, signals what is 
perhaps the most depressing aspect of the 
rise of the alt- right as a protofascist move-
ment. It highlights the fact that “there was 
a revolutionary potential, a dissatisfaction, 
which the Left was not able to mobilize” 
(Žižek 2010: 152), or in fact, that the revolu-
tionary potential of the Left failed by being 
beaten out by the predominant liberal 
status quo. There are, then, two ways to 
understand the failure of the Left in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis of capitalism: (1) a 
failure of mobilization; (2) a failure to break 
through and defeat the liberal ruling class. 
The first problem is one of building up the 
Left as a hegemonic force. In some ways, 
the Arab Spring and OWS did demonstrate 
a wave of postcrisis leftist enlightenment, 
which saw rising popularity of left- wing 
political parties, such as Syriza in Greece, 
as well as avowed socialist figures like 
Bernie Sanders in the United States and 
Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom. But 
Syriza’s inability to defeat the European 
“Troika” (the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund) in its austerity talks, 
the pro- Brexit vote in the UK, and Sand-
ers’s failure to secure the nomination to 
become the Democratic Party’s candidate 
for president all showed signs of defeat for 
a Left that rose up only to be beaten back 
down, not by the alt- right but in fact pri-
marily by the liberal status quo. Therefore, 
according to Žižek, the liberal ruling class 
and the fascistic reaction are two sides of 
the same coin.
Žižek distinguishes liberal agency from 
that of the fascist by comparing two dif-
ferent modes of fetishism: the permissive- 
cynical form and the populist- fascistic 
form (2009: 66). The first form is tied to a 
false universality: “The subject advocates 
freedom or equality, while being unaware 
of implicit qualifications which, in their very 
form, constrain its scope (the privileging 
of certain social strata: being rich, or male, 
or belonging to a certain culture, etc.).” 
The second form, in contrast, “involves a 
false identification of both the nature of the 
antagonism and the enemy: class struggle 
is displaced, for instance, onto the strug-
gle with the Jews, so that popular rage at 
being exploited is redirected away from 
capitalist relations as such and onto the 
‘Jewish plot’ ” (66). Both forms, then, oper-
ate through the odd pairing of the fetish 
and the symptom: the formal fetishism of 
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the liberal permissive cynic, both in the 
form of the commodity and in the form 
of the law (i.e., equality before the eyes 
of the law), produces as its symptom the 
proletarianized subject as its excess; in 
the case of the populist- fascist, the figure 
of the other or the enemy (“Jew” in the 
case of Nazi anti- Semitism, for instance; 
feminists and cultural Marxists in the case 
of the alt- right) is fetishized, displacing the 
centrality of the class struggle (67). The 
paradox is that, although demystification 
is easier with the permissive enlightened 
liberal — identification of class struggle as 
the real problem or threat — such a liberal is 
in terms of the class struggle the real class 
enemy, while those who would be the 
apparent proletarianized class ally are more 
difficult to enlighten, preferring instead to 
blame the racialized and gendered other as 
a scapegoat. For Žižek, this does not mean 
that we should simply “understand” the 
racism and the sexism of the proletariat; 
rather, what it suggests is that, instead 
of simply preaching liberal tolerance and 
permissiveness, it is necessary to artic-
ulate the underlying class dimensions 
of the class struggle directly in nonmys-
tified terms. This is why, as he puts it, 
although “one should have no qualms 
about concluding short- term alliances with 
egalitarian liberals as part of the anti- sexist 
and anti- racist struggle,” in the long term, 
“the success of the radical emancipatory 
struggle depends on mobilizing the lower 
classes who are today often in the thrall to 
fundamentalist populism” (73).
Herein lies the difficulty with the alt- 
right: they are fetishist in both the cynical 
and the fascistic sense. In their cynical 
form, they distance themselves from 
their position via rational discourse and 
critical interpretation — when one listens 
to speeches given by Richard Spencer, 
as deplorable as his arguments sound, 
these are not the ravings of a mad man 
but the carefully thought out and char-
ismatic pseudo- intellectual statements 
of a “leader” — the movement, in other 
words, produces organic intellectuals. But 
in its fascist populist form, the movement 
clings to the other as fetish, disavowing 
the centrality of the class struggle, using 
the other — feminists and cultural Marx-
ists, SJWs, and so forth — to displace this 
centrality. Therefore, rather than try to 
convince members of the alt- right, through 
rational critical interpretation, that their 
rage is simply displaced, they should be 
seen more so as a reactionary formation, 
the symptomal product of the defeat of 
the Left by the liberal ruling class. It is for 
this reason that, if the alt- right is to be 
defeated, the challenge is to defeat the 
liberal ruling class. As Žižek puts it, for the 
Left, “the only true alternative is the one 
between itself and the liberal mainstream, 
the populist ‘radical’ Right being nothing 
but the symptom of liberalism’s inability to 
deal with the Leftist threat” (75).
“Bernie Would Have Won!”:  
A Provisional Conclusion
“Against the postmodernist suspicion of grand 
narratives, we need to reassert that, far from being 
isolated, contingent problems, these are all the 
effects of a single systemic cause: Capital.”
— Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No 
Alternative?
As I noted above, subversion and trans-
gression have been embraced and diffused 
as virtues into the culture of postmodern 
capitalism. Formally and aesthetically, 
the alt- right follows a tradition that has a 
lineage going back to the modernist ethics 
of transgression and subversion. At the 
same time, their public demonstrations, 
and alarms about the anti – free speech 
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SJWs, particularly on university campuses, 
appear to have adopted the tactics of the 
radical New Left from the 1960s. While 
the ideological content of the alt- right is 
determinatively conservative, at a formal 
level, their tactics start to mimic the tradi-
tional and New Left, especially when one 
of their chief characteristics is a hypervigi-
lance toward breaking taboos. The alt- right, 
in this way, has more in common with the 
counterculture of May ’68 than it does with 
anything resembling the traditional Right 
(Nagle 2017: 28). As well, the alt- right 
demonstrates that a formal transgression 
of the existing order is not necessarily one 
that moves in the direction of emancipa-
tory and progressive change. As Nagle 
puts it, “disrespect for its own sake” mir-
rors the modern avant- garde’s ethic of “art 
for art’s sake.” The ethic of the alt- right 
has taken on a Nietzschean “cult of moral 
transgression,” that even informed much 
of early (and in some cases, contemporary) 
post- structuralism (31). For the Marquis de 
Sade, the surrealists, R. D. Laing, and even 
in some sense in the writings of Deleuze 
and Guattari, madness and insanity are 
signs of nonconformity. The alt- right’s 
celebration of the carnivalesque and the 
grotesque in practices such as “RIP Troll-
ing” (trolling Facebook and Twitter pages 
of the recently deceased) demonstrates 
why, I claim, even anarchist practices of 
the carnivalesque, such as those described 
by Simon Critchley — advocating for “a new 
language of civil disobedience that com-
bines street- theatre, festival, performance 
art and what might be descried as forms 
of non- violent warfare,” and including 
things like “carnivalesque humour” (2007: 
123) — are easily co- optable by the alt- right 
Chan and meme culture. There is, in fact, 
nothing inherently radical or emancipatory 
about empty formal tactics such as these. 
As well, through websites like Breitbart 
News, which even the mainstream mass 
media now seem to cite as a legitimate 
source of news, the alt- right also manages 
to incorporate public sphere and liberal 
critiques of elitism into its arsenal, allowing 
it to appear sympathetic to the concerns 
of the average Joe. What, then, is the 
solution?
Perhaps, rather than focus on a 
politics of subversion and transgression, 
it is time to build toward a new “common 
sense.” If there is anything positive to 
say about the past decade of protest and 
Left politics, it is that a new language and 
narrative of understanding — a new form of 
cognitive mapping — seem capable of inter-
pellating a new Left sensibility. Although 
OWS ultimately dissipated, its lasting 
effect has been a renewed discourse 
about the class struggle — the 99% versus 
the 1%, language that even mathematically 
makes visible the disparity between the 
two class positions, so that it does not 
appear as though we were talking about 
two antagonistic groups on a level playing 
field. What it emphasizes is the deep dis-
parity in size and reach of the population, 
to show that the majority is proletarianized. 
Furthermore, another particularly youth-
ful group of people is coalescing around 
figures like Sanders and Corbyn. One of 
Sanders’s greatest achievements during 
his campaign for the Democratic nomina-
tion was to help destigmatize the word 
socialism. Many young people now openly 
identify as “socialists” (see Ehrenfreund 
2016 and Meyerson 2016). The term is 
beginning to lose the ideological baggage 
that it carried during the Cold War.
Out of the actual contradictions of 
capitalism, people are beginning to imag-
ine real alternatives, and a new common 
sense is in fact forming, whose main 
antagonist has been less the alt- right and 
megalomaniacal figures like Trump than 
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figures at the center who, to maintain 
power, have slowly shifted over the  
period of neoliberalism increasingly to the 
right. They court the Right and the center 
in economic terms to defeat the Left. 
However, their apparent social liberalism  
is finally being undermined by their 
staunch economic conservatism. Paradoxi-
cally, it is the populist rhetoric of a socialist 
economic narrative, mixed with a right- 
wing racist and sexist social identity, that 
brought the masses toward Trump. Recall 
that much of Trump’s economic rhetoric 
included discussion of policies normally 
addressed by the Left (withdrawing from 
the TPP, for instance; criticisms of the 
mainstream mass media), but couched in 
inflammatory racist rhetoric about illegal 
immigrants and terrorists. Perhaps, then,  
if the socialist Left is so much of a threat  
to that liberal center — so much so that it 
sees a rightward shift as its only solution — 
and if apparent supporters of the alt- right 
are themselves courted by economic 
socialism, then maybe (just maybe) social-
ism (and dare we say “communism”) really 
is our new common sense.
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